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REDEFINING LANDLORD TORT LIABILiTY
Sargent v. Ross, - N.H. -, 308 A.2d 528 (1973)
Plaintiffs sued their landlord for damages as a result of the death
of their four-year-old child. The child had fallen from a stairway that
the landlord had added to the building eight years before the accident.
The stairway's steep pitch and the lack of a railing sufficient to
keep the child from falling over the side were shown to be the causes of
the accident. The trial court gave judgment for the parents. On ap-
peal, the landlord argued that there was no evidence of a concealed
defect of which he should have been aware, that he had retained no
control over the stairway, and therefore, that he owed no duty to either
the parents or the child. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court and held: Questions of control, hidden defects, and
common or public use, which previously had to be established as pre-
requisites to consideration of a landlord's negligence, are relevant only
to the basic tort issues of foreseeability and unreasonableness of a par-
ticular risk of harm.1
At common law a lease was considered the sale of an interest in
land,2 and the tenant assumed all the responsibilities of ownership.2
Absent fraudulent misrepresentation 4 or the failure to warn of known
concealed defects,5 the landlord was shielded by the doctrine of caveat
1. Sargent v. Ross, - N.H. -, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). Contra, American Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Jackson, 187 F.2d 379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 818 (1951) (where
plaintiff's child pulled away from plaintiff and fell through stair railing, landlord was
not liable under Louisiana law because railing was safe for adults and landlord could
reasonably expect that parent would look out for child).
2. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PRoPERTY § 221 (1973). See generally Hark-
rider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 MicH. L. RFv. 260 (1928).
3. Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63 (1809); Lipsitz v. Schecter, 377 Mich. 685, 142
N.W.2d 1 (1966); Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876). See generally 2 F. POLLOcG:
& F. MArrLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 131 (2d ed. 1923).
4. See, e.g., Logsdon v. Central Dev. Ass'n, Inc., 233 Mo. App. 499, 123 S.W.2d
631 (1938); Daly v. Wise, 132 N.Y. 306, 30 N.E. 837 (1892).
5. Anderson v. Schuman, 257 Cal. App. 2d 272, 64 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1967); Wright
v. Peterson, 259 Iowa 1239, 146 N.W.2d 617 (1966); Smith v. Green, 358 Mass. 76,
260 N.E.2d 656 (1970); Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (App. Div.
1953). The duty to disclose known concealed defects also applied to the tenant's family
and those who entered at the tenant's request. See, e.g., Wilensky v. Perell, 72 So. 2d
278 (Fla. 1954); Rahn v. Beurskens, 66 IlL. App. 2d 423, 213 N.E.2d 301 (1966); Texas
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emptor, and was not responsible for injuries suffered by the tenant due
to a defect on the premises. 6 Courts eventually recognized certain ex-
ceptions to this general rule of nonliability7 For the tenant, the most
Co. v. Sowers, 258 S.W.2d 924 (Ky. 1953); Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d
252 (1959); Busch v. Gaglio, 207 Va. 343, 150 S.E.2d 110 (1966).
Although it was once necessary for the landlord to have actual knowledge of a latent
defect, the courts have developed various standards to charge the landlord with construc-
live knowledge. See Cohen Bros. v. Krumbein, 28 Ga. App. 788, 113 S.E. 58 (1922)
(discoverable in exercise of ordinary care); Johnson v. O'Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 105
N.W.2d 244 (1960) (prudent owner would have known); Reckert v. Roco Petroleum
Corp., 411 S.W.2d 199 (Mo. 1966) (should have known); Cohen v. Cotheal, 156 App.
Div. 784, 142 N.Y.S. 99 (1913), aff'd mem., 215 N.Y. 659, 109 N.E. 1070 (1915) (dis-
coverable by reasonable inspection).
A Tennessee decision in 1898 held that the landlord had an affirmative duty to inspect
prior to transferring the premises to the tenant. Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 46
S.W. 297 (1898). However, the case has not been followed in either Tennessee or other
states. See Woods v. Forest Hill Cemetery, Inc., 183 Tenn. 413, 423, 192 S.W.2d 987,
991 (1946) (landlord is under no obligation to make premises tenantable absent express
agreement); Pyburn v. Fourseam Coal Co., 303 Ky. 443, 197 S.W.2d 921 (1946); State
ex rel. Bohon v. Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 113 A.2d 100 (1955); Harrill v. Sinclair Ref.,
Co., 225 N.C. 421, 35 S.E.2d 240 (1945).
6. See, e.g., Little Rock Ice Co. v. Consumers Ice Co., 114 Ark. 532, 170 S.W.
241 (1914) (lessees right to withhold rent); Bowe v. Hunking, 135 Mass. 380 (1883).
Other cases are collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1453 (1919). For a general discussion
of caveat emptor, see Grimes, Caveat Lessee, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. Rv. 189 (1968);
Waite, Caveat Emptor and the Judicial Process, 25 COLUM. L. Rlv. 129 (1925).
7. This Comment focuses on the landlord's tort liability to the tenant, but two
other categories of landlord tort liability should be noted. First, the landlord is obli-
gated to inspect and repair the premises if the tenant intends to admit the public; thus,
the landlord may be liable to patrons who enter the demised premises and are injured
by a structural defect that he should have repaired. See Spain v. Kelland, 93 Ariz. 172,
379 P.2d 149 (1963) (landlord liable in tort to tavern patron); Webel v. Yale Univ.,
125 Conn. 515, 7 A.2d 215 (1939) (beauty shop); Lang v. Stadium Purchasing Corp.,
216 App. Div. 558, 215 N.Y.S. 502 (1926) (theater); Tulsa Entertainment Co. v.
Greenless, 85 Okla. 113, 205 P. 179 (1922) (grandstands); Larson v. Colder's Park Co.,
54 Utah 325, 180 P. 599 (1919) (amusement park); RETsTATEmENT (SECoND) OF TORTS
* 359 (1965). Some courts have refused to hold the landlord liable when an admittedly
public use did not involve the entry of large numbers of people. See, e.g., Marx v.
Standard Oil Co., 6 NJ. Super. 39, 69 A.2d 748 (App. Div. 1949) (lessor not liable
to gasoline station customer injured on demised premises); accord, RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 359 (1934). Contra, Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal. 2d 375, 240 P.2d
580 (1951) (lessor liable to injured gasoline station patron). The tenant is required
to make reasonable efforts to maintain the premises as they were at the inception of
the tenancy. See Rogers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 148 Conn. 104, 167 A.2d 712
(1961) (dictum).
The second category of landlord tort liability involves the responsibility of the land-
lord to correct dangerous conditions which threaten the safety of those passing near the
demised premises. See Granucci v. Claasen, 204 Cal. 509, 269 P. 437 (1928) (damaged
driveway crossing sidewalk space); Isham v. Broderick, 89 Minn. 397, 95 N.W. 224
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important of these exceptions was that which held the landlord liable
in tort for failure to maintain common areas under the landlord's
control.8
Recently courts have begun to expand the scope of a landlord's tort
liability. The elimination of technical status categories of invitee, li-
censee, and trespasser has met with judicial approval., Although it was
once the majority rule that the landlord's breach of a covenant -to repair
permitted only a contract action for the cost of repair,"0 a growing num-
ber of states have allowed recovery in tort." Also, dissatisfaction with
the necessity of establishing the landlord's control over an area before
holding him liable in tort has led courts to define control more loosely. 12
(1903) (discharge of water across sidewalk); City of San Angelo v. Sitas, 143 Tex. 154,
183 S.W.2d 417 (1944) (sign protruding from demised premises). The lessor could
even be responsible to outsiders for dangerous conditions created or maintained by the
tenant with the lessor's permission. See Laurensi v. Vranizan, 25 Cal. 2d 806, 155 P.2d
633 (1945); Fagan v. Silver, 57 Mont. 827, 188 P. 900 (1920) (landlord who leased
stone quarry is responsible for injuries occurring while quarry was operated by tenant).
8. See Trimble v. Spears, 182 Kan. 406, 320 P.2d 1029 (1958) (doorway on side-
walk); Sonne v. Booker, 310 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1958) (fire escape used as general stair-
way); Temple v. Congress Square Garage, 145 Me. 274, 75 A.2d 459 (1950) (hall);
Chalfen v. Kraft, 324 Mass. 1, 84 N.E.2d 454 (1949) (area under stairway).
9. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968) (distinction between licensee and invitee abolished with respect to duty owed by
landowner); Louisville Trust Co. v. Nuitting, 437 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1968) (in applying
attractive nuisance doctrine, child's status as trespasser, licensee, or invitee is not con-
trolling). These distinctions have also been eliminated in other areas of the law. See
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (standing to object to admission of allegedly
unlawfully seized evidence is not dependent upon defendant's entrant classification);
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959) (common law
distinction between licensee and invitee not imported into admiralty law).
10. See Goff v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 415 (D. Me. 1958); Crawford v. Orner
& Shayne, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 568, 73 N.E.2d 615 (1947) (dictum); Leavitt v. Twin
County Rental Co., 222 N.C. 81, 21 S.E.2d 890 (1942); Dick v. Sunbright Steam Laun-
dry Corp., 307 N.Y. 422, 121 N.E.2d 399 (1954); Young v. Beattie, 172 Okla. 250, 45
P.2d 470 (1935); Caudill v. Gibson Fuel Co., 185 Va. 233, 38 S.E.2d 465 (1946).
11. See Williams v. Davis, 188 Kan. 385, 362 P.2d 641 (1961); Sacks v. Pleasant,
253 Md. 40, 251 A.2d 858 (1969); Zuroski v. Estate of Strickland, 176 Neb. 633, 126
N.W.2d 888 (1964); Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968); Ram-
pone v. Wonskuck Bldgs., Inc., 102 R.I. 30, 227 A.2d 586 (1967). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 357 (1965).
It is uniformly held that the landlord is liable for negligently made repairs. See
Youngset, Inc. v. Five City Plaza, Inc., 156 Conn. 22, 237 A.2d 366 (1968); Hunter
v. Cook, 149 Ind. App. 657. 274 N.E.2d 550 (1971); Jellico Coal Co. v. Dulling, 282
Ky. 698, 139 S.W.2d 749 (1949); Finer v. Nichols, 175 Mo. App. 525, 157 S.W. 1023
(1913); Bross v. Varner, 159 Pa. Super. 495, 48 A.2d 880 (1946).
12. See, e.g., Berks v. Blackman, 52 Cal. 2d 715, 344 P.2d 301 (1959) (where ten-
ant had exclusive use of stairway it was question of fact whether stairway was common
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In Sargent v. Ross, the court abrogated the rule of control in favor
of a broad standard of due care, 1 3 after reasoning as follows: Reliance
upon the control rule prevents consideration of the essential issue of
whether the landlord acted reasonably under the circumstances.'14
Predicating liability on the necessity of showing control is a departure
from the more general tort principle that one may be liable where his
negligence has created a dangerous condition over which he no longer
has exclusive control. 15 Moreover, the control rule is anomalous be-
cause it may lead to a situation in which neither the tenant nor the land-
lord is responsible for correcting a dangerous situation.' Indeed, the
rule discourages the landlord from making repairs for fear of admitting
control.17  Concern for human safety in an increasingly urban society
supports abrogation of landlord tort immunity.' 8 Finally, adoption of
a general standard of due care accords with those cases recognizing the
implied warranty of habitability. 9
Having previously recognized the implied warranty of habitability,20
the New Hampshire court has now taken the additional step of making
the landlord liable for injuries suffered on inadequately maintained
area over which landlord exercised control); Fantacone v. McQueen, 196 Cal. App. 2d
477, 16 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1961) (where tenant used ladder leading to roof there was ques-
tion of fact whether it was common area over which landlord retained control); Taylor
v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956) (tenant's guest
permitted to recover for fall on common area against landlord who had acquired legal,
but not actual, control). Contra, Weaver v. United States, 334 F.2d 319 (10th Cir.
1964).
13. - N.H. at -, 308 A.2d at 534-35. Various definitions of due care have been
espoused. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928)
(risk reasonably to be perceived defines duty to be obeyed); Heaven v. Pender, 11
Q.B.D. 503 (1883) (when everyone of ordinary sense perceiving the situation would rec-
ognize that if he did not exercise ordinary care in his conduct with regard to the situa-
tion he would create a danger of injury to others, a duty to use ordinary care and skill
arises). See generally James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. Rnv.
778 (1953); Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective, 41 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1927);
Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1915).
14. - N.H. at -, 308 A.2d at 531.
15. Id. at -, 308 A.2d at 532.
16. Id., 308 A.2d at 532.
17. Id., 308 A.2d at 532.
18. Id. at -, 308 A.2d at 533.
19. Id., 308 A.2d at 533.
20. See Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971). Other jurisdictions
have also recognized the implied warranty of habitability. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62,
102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, -
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/7
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premises. 21 However, no clear standard emerges for determining
whether the landlord acted as a reasonable man. Moreover, it remains
uncertain whether facts sufficient to show a breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability also justify recovery in tort. By abolishing the con-
trol rule, the court has created an obligation for the landlord to inspect
and repair not only those areas under his immediate control, but also
the inside of the tenant's apartment, 22 except in the case of damage
done by the tenant.
Implicitly, the court assumes that the landlord is better able to bear
the financial loss of injuries attendant upon the operation of leased
dwellings.23  However, this assumption obscures the fundamental issue
in the low-income housing market: Is either the landlord or the tenant
able to meet the cost of improving the quality of the premises? In this
connection, two subsidiary questions arise. The first is whether the
landlord of low-income housing is making a sufficient profit to absorb
the increased cost of warranting the fitness of the premises. 24  The
second is whether the landlord can pass the additional operating costs
on to the tenant in the form of higher rent.
Although the-belief persists that the "slum landlord" 25 makes exorbi-
tant profits at the expense of his tenant's health and safety, 20 mounting
Iowa -, 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972); Fritz v. Warthen, - Minn. -, 213 N.W.2d 339
(1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Marini v. Ireland,
56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Amanuensis Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318
N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y. City Ct. 1971); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160
(1973); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
21. Sargent v. Ross, - N.H. -, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). Courts in the District of
Columbia have reached the same result. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment
Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (landlord liable to tenant for criminal act of third
party where level of building security provided by landlord had been reduced since be-
ginning of tenancy); Gould v. DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (landlord liable
for injuries suffered by trespassing child who fell through broken screening which local
housing code required to be sufficient to keep out insects).
22. Cf. Garcia v. Freeland Realty, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1970) (tenant permitted to recover cost of removing lead paint from inside of
her apartment).
23. This is the risk distribution theory which seeks to impose tort liability in a man-
ner most conducive to ameliorating the adverse economic impact of injuries throughout
society. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402, comment c (1965).
24. The landlord's cost may be expected to rise either because judgments are
awarded against the landlord for injuries suffered on the premises or because the land-
lord undertakes more inspection and repair.
25. See Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REv. 869 (1967).
26. See generally W. KINm, LET IN Tm StN (1964).
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evidence refutes this position. A study of inner city housing in Newark
revealed a pattern of small-scale ownership which provided only
modest returns.17  Large profits, to the extent they are made, come
about through such modest returns on a large number of holdings.2"
The growing rate of residential abandonment 9 seems -to indicate that
inner city landlords are caught in a profit squeeze: current rents are
insufficient to permit extensive capital improvement that would attract
tenants able to pay higher rents, 30 and higher rents may be beyond the
resources of present tenants.31 Thus, the adoption of a standard of tort
liability which promises to facilitate the tenant's recovery against the
landlord may accelerate the growing abandonment by inner city land-
lords of their low-income property. The low-income tenant may find
27. G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 122 (1969).
28. M. STEGMAN, HoUsING INVESTMENT IN THE INNER CITY: THE DYNAMIcs o
DECLINE 90 (1972).
29. Between 1960 and 1965, 15,000 units were annually removed from the New
York City market for reasons other than demolition to make way for new construction.
From 1965 to 1967 the figure climbed to 38,000 annually. I. LOWRY, RENTAL HOUSING
IN NEW YORK CITY: CONFRONTING THE CRISIS 6 (Rand Doc. 1970). Moreover, aban-
donments are concentrated in low-income slum areas. See G. STERNLIEB & R. BUtRCH-
ELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT (1973); de Vise, Chicago 1971 Ready for Another
Fire, in GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN POVERTY 62 (R. Peet ed. 1972).
30. F. KRISTOFF, URBAN HOUSING NEEDS THROUGH THE 1980's, at 48-49 (1968); G.
STERNLEB, THE URBAN HousING DILEMMA 47 (1972).
The prevalence of small-scale ownership further obstructs efforts to improve the qual-
ity of inner city residential units. The value of renovation by one owner may be dissi-
pated by the negative externalities of the surrounding area, i.e. it would be difficult to
rent a refurnished townhouse in the middle of a slum unless the rent were so low as
to compensate the tenant for the surrounding environment. Thus, the individual land-
lord may perceive the futility of undertaking any improvements. See Davis & Whinston,
The Economics of Urban Renewal, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 105 (1961). See also
J. ROTHENBERO, ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF URBAN RENEWAL 47 (1967).
Further, the virtual collapse of the inner city mortgage market frequently prevents a
landlord from obtaining the funds necessary to undertake significant repairs. See G.
STERNLIEB, THE URBAN HOUSING DILEMMA ch. 11 (1972). See also L. GREBLER, HOUS-
ING MARKET BEHAVIOR IN A DECLINING AREA 105 (1952); Muth, Urban Residential and
Housing Markets, in ISSUES IN URBAN EcONOMIcs 302-312 (1968).
31. According to the 1970 census, 81% of those families with incomes below $5,000
who rent spend over 25% of their gross income on rent, and 62% of these families
spend over 35% of their gross income on rent. A. DOWNS, FEDERAL HOUSING SUB-
sDmIES: How ARE THEY WORKING? 4 (1973). In a New York City study, it was re-
vealed that, of 296,C00 welfare households paying cash rent, over 83% reported rent/in-
come ratios greater than 25%, and 56% reported rent/income ratios greater than 35%.
I. LowRY, RENTAL HOUSING INNEW YORK CITY: THE DEMAND FOR SHELTER 62 (Rand
Doc. 1971) (Table 14). It has been suggested that expenditures for rent consuming
more than 25% of gross income are excessive. Id. at 127.
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less substandard housing.32 The net result may be the replacement of
relatively inexpensive, substandard housing by standard, but over-
crowded, housing.
32. See note 29 supra.
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